Publications
Heller, Abigail L. "Public Support for Electoral Reform: The Role of Electoral System Experience." Forthcoming at Electoral Studies.
Abstract: What affects public support for electoral reform? How does experience with different electoral systems affect people’s willingness to support electoral reform? Given the salience of changes to election rules even when they are passed via the legislature and the increasing use of referenda as alternative mechanisms for change, these questions are critical to understanding when electoral reform will occur. I argue that experience (specifically, with an electoral system similar to that under consideration) affects public opinion by reducing uncertainty about the likely effects of reform and thus affects support for reform (although the direction of the effect depends on partisan bias). Moreover, I argue that experience is most important in the absence of strong party cues. I leverage subnational electoral system variation in the United Kingdom and find that experience does affect support for reform — negative experiences decrease support for reform. The results have implications for the possibility of electoral reform in the UK and beyond.
View article here. View supplementary appendix here.
Gandhi, Jennifer and Abigail L. Heller. 2018. "Electoral Systems in Authoritarian States." In The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems, Erik S. Herron, Robert J. Pekkanen, and Matthew Soberg Shugart (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Abstract: The literature on the choice and effects of electoral rules in autocracies tends to focus on the preferences of the dictator. While sensible, it is important to recognize that even the most powerful autocrats choose rules under constraints. The constraints may come in the form of opposition actors who threaten the regime or the dictator’s own limited information or knowledge about how the rules work and the distribution of preferences among the electorate. The uncertainty over voter preferences is a particularly acute problem for autocracies where coercion and manipulation are rampant, and the expression of sincere preferences through media and electoral polls is limited. These tactics enable autocrats to win elections, but may condition the effects of electoral rules, making the choice of rules difficult in the first place. The end result may be that the problem of electoral choice is more difficult for autocrats even if they face fewer formal institutional constraints than their democratic counterparts.
The online edition of the chapter may be found here (login required, but the chapter may be accessed via the Oxford Handbooks website through most university libraries for free).
A pdf version may be found here (note: there may be minor differences between this version and the published version).
Heller, Abigail L. 2012. “Duverger’s Law and the Case of Great Britain.” Journal of Undergraduate International Studies 13: 10-22.
Abstract: In the 1950’s Maurice Duverger formulated what has become known as Duverger’s Law. Widely accepted and taught, it states that plurality electoral systems favor two-party systems. However, exceptions or challenges to the law have been noted. One such challenge is the case of Britain, particularly following the 2010 General Elections that resulted in a hung parliament. I explore whether Britain may be seen as adhering to Duverger’s Law at the national or constituency levels. After determining that Britain presents a serious challenge to Duverger, I investigate why Britain is an exception.
Working Papers
Gandhi, Jennifer, Abigail L. Heller, and Ora John Reuter. "Shoring up Power: Electoral Reform and the Consolidation of Authoritarian Rule."
Abstract: Why do autocrats adopt proportional representation (PR)? Conventional wisdom suggests autocrats should prefer majoritarian electoral rules because they favor large parties. Yet, since 1945, autocrats have been almost three times more likely to institute reforms towards PR than majoritarianism. Existing literature suggests incumbents institute PR to divide the opposition. We explore another motivation: executives switch to PR to ensure discipline among allies. We argue that such reforms are most likely when autocrats have a particular need to impose discipline — when ruling parties are nascent. Empirically, we examine the conditions under which changes to PR are likely with cross-national data from all electoral autocracies between 1945 and 2012. Additionally, we investigate a prominent case — the 2005 switch to PR in Russia — to illustrate the mechanisms and show how the reform solved the problem of control, allowing the Kremlin to focus on selecting electorally strong candidates.
View paper here.
Heller, Abigail L. "The Battle over Gerrymandered Districts: How Americans Balance Fairness and Partisanship."
Abstract: To what extent do individuals value fair elections versus those that deliver their pre- ferred partisan and policy outcomes? How do residents of the United States balance their preferences regarding fair elections with their potentially competing preferences over election outcomes? How robust are people’s preferences for democratic elections? These questions are critical because citizens are supposed to be the last defense against democratic backsliding. I explore these questions using a conjoint survey experiment of over 2,100 U.S. residents. I find that concerns about fairness affect the willingness of respondents to support redistricting proposals, but that the effects are conditional on the level of party polarization and the strength of respondents’ partisanship.
View paper here.
Heller, Abigail L. "Legislating Themselves Out of Office: Electoral Reform and Parties as Non-Unitary Actors."
Abstract: Many theories of electoral reform assume parties are unitary actors and that a party in power will change the electoral system to maximize its share of legislative seats. This approach overlooks that electoral reforms may have different consequences across members of a single party — even when reforms are expected to benefit the party as a whole, they may disadvantage certain members. Moreover, if the proposed reform will damage the electoral prospects of members, the party leadership is hindered in their ability to wield certain incentives they would usually use to control members. Given this, why would a rank-and-file legislator support an electoral reform that is likely to cost her the seat? I argue legislators are more likely to support such a reform — to legislative themselves out of office — when they expect compensation from the party leadership in the form of extra-parliamentary patronage (appointments) if they lose the election or rewards if they retain the seat. I test this argument using information on the career trajectories of members of Parliament in the United Kingdom and leveraging the 1885 Redistribution of Seats Act.
View paper here.